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CASEBOOKS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: 
REFLECTIONS UPON THE PUBLICATION 
OF A NEW BOOK 
Robert Allen Sedler* 
CONFLICT OF LAws: CASES AND MATERIALS. By James A. 
Martin. Boston: Little, Brown, 1978. Pp. xii, 739. $20.75. 
With tlie publication of Conflict of Laws: Cases and 
Materials by Professor James A. Martin of the University of 
Michigan, 1 the already ample choice of casebooks for conflicts 
teachers is made even more ample. Those who favor the more 
traditional pedagogy continue to have a choice between Reese & 
Rosenberg2 or Scoles & Weintraub.3 Those who emphasize com-
peting theories and methodologies and the interrelationship be-
tween the various areas of the subject4 can now choose between 
Cramton, Currie & Kay5 and Professor Martin's new book. 
Within either category the choice is not momentous. The case-
books all reflect the standard of excellence long associated with 
conflicts scholarship, 8 and Professor Martin's book clearly follows 
in this tradition. 7 
Like the Cramton, Currie & Kay opus, Professor Martin's 
book develops the choice-of-law process by examining at length 
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University. A.B., 1956 J.D., 1959, University 
of Pittsburgh.-Ed. 
1. J. MARTIN, CONFLICT OF LAws: CASES AND MATERIALS (1978). 
2. W. REESE & M. RosENBERG, CASES ON CONFLICT OF LAws (7th ed. 1978) [hereinafter 
cited as REESE & RosENBERG]. 
3. E. ScoLES & J. WEINTRAUB, CONFLICT OF LAws (2d ed. 1972 & Supp. 1978) 
[hereinafter cited as SCOLES & WEINTRAUB]. 
4. "A substantial core of common considerations underlie jurisdiction, choice of law, 
and judgments, on both federal and state levels." R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, 
CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES-COMMENTS-QUESTIONS xii (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as 
CRAMTON, CURRIE & KAY]. 
5. See CRAMTON, CURRIE & KAY note 4 supra. 
6. As a distinguished scholar in another field observed some years ago: "[o]n a 
generous estimate, one litigated case out of every hundred may involve a question of 
conflicts of laws. Yet the subject of conflicts has attracted the best thinking and the most 
diligent research of a host of capable scholars. Magnificent treatises explore its every 
intricacy; fruitful theories abound by which it may be explained and understood and 
reshaped." Wright, The Law of Remedies as a Social Institution, 18 U. DE'r. L.J. 376, 376 
(1955). 
7, As to the impact of the existing body of conflicts scholarship on the direction of 
future scholarly efforts, see the discussion in Sedler, Book Review, 50 TExA8 L. REv. 1064, 
1065-66 (1972) (review of R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws (1971)), 
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first the theory of the traditional approach, 8 and its operation in 
practice, and then the "New Learning," or as Professor Martin 
says in his Preface, "the struggle of the courts and the commenta-
tors to come up with a more responsive (but not unduly compli-
cated) approach." 9 The other components of the sub-
ject-constitutional limitations on choice of law, Erie and federal 
matters, jurisdiction, recognition of judgments, and divorce and 
fa:\llilY matters-Professor Martin relates to the book's treatment 
of the choice-of-law process. The distinctive feature of Professor 
Martin's book is his presentation of the materials: the very care-
ful selection of cases and academic commentary and the often 
penetrating questions and comments that follow. 10 My only sub-
stantive criticism is that Professor Martin could have paid a little 
more attention to choice of law in contracts and to the application 
of the "New Learning" in this area. This omission does not de-
tract from the overall excellence of the book, and my criticism 
simply reflects my own desire that policy-centered solutions 
should apply in this area as well.11 
In my review of the Cram ton, Currie & Kay book, 12 I com-
mented on the book's potential for "revolutionary conflicts ped-
agogy" because the materials were structured in such a way as 
to make choice of law "manageable," to allow ample time for 
coverage of the other components of the subject, and to relate all 
of the components to each other.13 In addition, I noted that the 
approach of the authors to the subject made it clear that the 
course in conflicts is a course about federalism, particularly the 
interstate aspect of "our Federalism."14 These comments are 
equally applicable to Professor Martin's book. Thus, there is an 
important difference in approach between the Cramton, Currie & 
Kay and Martin books, on one hand, and the Reese & Rosenberg 
and Scoles & Weintraub books on the other. This difference in 
approach will necessarily affect how the course is taught, so that 
selection of a casebook should depend on the approach to the 
8. Professor Martin refers to this as the "Territorialist Approach," and begins with a 
discussion of the conflicts issues involved in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 
393 (1857). 
9. Preface to J. MARTIN, supra note 1, at xix. 
10. Not to mention some very clever cartoons. 
11. See generally Sedler, The Contracts Provisions of the Restatement (Second): An 
Analysis and a Critique, 72 CoLUM. L. REv. 279, 302-15 (1972). 
12. Sedler, Book Review, 28 J. LEGAL Enuc. 592 (1977). 
13. Id. at 594-96. 
14. In my view, this is the primary justification for a comprehensive course in con-
flicts in the law school curriculum. Id. at 596-97. 
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subject the particular teacher favors. 
The Cramton-Currie-Kay-Martin approach focuses on com-
peting theories and methodologies and the interrelationship be-
tween choice of law and the other components of the subject. The 
emphasis is on the choice-of-law process as a whole and on the 
transferability of its theory and methodology to "tort, contract, 
and the other pigeonholes."15 Similarly, the student's considera-
tion of the interrelationship between choice of law and the other 
components of the subject may lead to a more refined analysis 
both of choice-of-law problems and problems arising in regard to 
jurisdiction, recognition of judgments, and the like.16 
The Reese-Rosenberg-Scoles-Weintraub approach, in con-
trast, despite some effort to "tie things together," still ends up 
discussing particularized solutions. Although both books include 
a chapter on "pervasive" or "threshold" problems, 17 choice of law 
is essentially considered in terms of the different substantive 
areas of torts, contracts, and the like. In Scoles & Weintraub, the 
field is explicitly divided in this way. There is no detailed consid-
eration of competing theories and methodologies or of the choice-
of-law process as a whole.18 Reese & Rosenberg purport both to 
discuss competing theories and methodologies and to "preserve 
useful ... classifications."19 The authors state that in Chapters 
Eight and Nine they deal with "the whole sweep of choice-of-law 
problems" and that in later chapters they deal with substantive 
areas such as property, family law, administration of estates, and 
business associations.2° Chapter Eight is headed "The Problem of 
Choosing the Rule of Decision" and covers the traditional· ap-
proach, escape devices, the search for new approaches, and the 
"new era." Most of the cases in that chapter, however, are tort 
cases, and tl;i.e consideration of the "scholarly camps" does little 
more than summarize the principal methodologies. There is no 
15. Preface to CRAMTON, CURRIE & KAY, supra note 4, at xiii. 
16. See Sedler, Judicial Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Interstate Accident Cases: 
The Implications of Shaffer v. Heitner, 1978 WASH. U. L.Q. 329; Sedler, Judicial Juris-
diction and Choice of Law: The Consequences of Shaffer v. Heitner, 63 loWA L. REv. 1031 
(1978). 
17. These chapters cover questions of public policy, substance-procedure distinc-
tions, and proof of foreign law. Both books also have a separate chapter on domicile. 
18. Only in the chapters on torts and contracts is there a separation of the traditional 
approach and modem solutions. 
19. Preface to REEsE & RosENBERG, supra note 2, at xix. The change from previous 
editions occurred in the sixth edition of the continuing series. The first edition was pub-
lished in 1936: E. CHEATHAM, N. DOWLING & H. GOODRICH, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS 
ON CONFLICT OF LAWS. 
~O. Preface to REESE & RosENBERG, supra note 2, at xix. 
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extended analysis of these methodologies nor any specific illustra-
tion of their operation. The emphasis is still on cases, and it is 
almost as if the "new approach" material has been superimposed 
on what was formerly the chapter on torts. Chapter Nine, titled 
"Choice of the Applicable Law: Further Considerations," is sub-
divided into sections on contracts, trusts, workmen's compensa-
tion, marriage, and property, with an additional section on 
"Changing Choice-of-Law Approaches, International and Inter-
state." Again, cases predominate over theory and methodology, 
and substantive areas predominate over a view of the choice-of-
law process as a whole. 
In regard to jurisdiction and recognition of judgments, Cram-
ton, Currie, Kay, and Martin treat these areas "in light of the 
wisdom derived from consideration of the basic choice-of-law 
problems."21 Their treatment differs from that of Reese, Rosen-
berg, Scoles, and Weintraub, who cover these areas in substan-
tially more detail and to a large extent independently of their 
coverage of choice of law. The same difference in treatment ap-
pears with respect to the Erie doctrine and federal common law. 22 
Clearly, then, conflicts teachers have both a "basic choice" 
and a "peripheral choice" of casebooks. The "basic choice" is 
whether to follow the Cramton-Currie-Kay-Martin approach to 
conflicts pedagogy, which stresses competing theories and metho-
dologies and the interrelationship between choice of law and the 
other components of the subject, or the Reese-Rosenberg-Scoles-
Weintraub approach, which emphasizes cases, substantive areas 
of choice of law, and detailed but essentially independent treat-
ment of the various components of the subject. Once the "basic 
choice" is made, the decision whether to use Cramton, Currie & 
Kay or Martin on one hand, or Reese & Rosenberg or Scoles & 
Weintraub on the other, is rather "peripheral." 
Thus far, I have discussed the basic difference in approach 
between the two sets of casebooks. What is equally interesting is 
that despite this basic difference, these casebook writers substan-
tially agree both on the methodologies and on the cases that 
should be included. All the casebooks necessarily pay considera-
ble attention to the traditional approach to choice of law. Not 
only does a substantial minority of American state courts still 
21. Preface to J. MARTIN, supra note 1, at xix. 
22. In addition, REEsE & RosENBERG, supra note 2, and ScoLEs & WEINTRAUB, supra 
note 3, cover a number of areas that are not covered in CRAMTON, CURRIE & KAY, supra 
note 4, and J. MARTIN, supra note 1, such as business associations. 
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follow the traditional approach,23 but an understanding of its 
theory and practice is crucial to an understanding of modern 
methodologies, all of which have been developed in one way or 
another in reaction to the traditional approach. Similarly, all of 
the casebooks examine carefully the Restatement Second, 24 which 
a number of courts explicitly follow25 and which may be likened 
to a "modern rules" approach with policy overtones.26 
There is also a clear pattern in the treatment of the other 
methodologies by the casebook authors. Cramton, Currie & Kay 
and Martin divide their treatment into essentially two parts: in-
terest analysis and "others." The "others" include both those 
methodologies that, while building on interest analysis as devel-
oped by the late Brainerd Currie, 27 propose solutions to true con-
flicts other than applying the forum's own law,28 and those that 
are comprehensive methodologies in themselves. Both Cramton, 
Currie & Kay and Martin present Leflar's choice-influencing con-
siderations, 29 neoterritorialism (as developed by Cavers and 
Twerski), 30 Ehrenzweig's "true rules, " 31 and Baxter's 
comparative-impairment solution to the resolution of the true 
conflict.32 Cramton, Currie & Kay, however, differ from Martin 
by offering an extended look at functional analysis, as developed 
by Weintraub33 and by Trautman and von Mehren.34 Returning 
23. See the listing in Sedler, Rules of Choice of Law Versus Choice-of-Law Rules: 
Judicial Method in Conflicts Torts Cases, 44 TENN. L. REv. 975, 975 n.2 (1977). 
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws (1971). 
25. For a listing of some of the states, see Sedler, supra note 23, at 1000 n. 109. 
26. I consider it to be essentially a "modem rules" approach. See Sedler, supra note 
11, at 284-85. As to its "policy overtones,'' see the discussion in CRAMTON, CURRIE & KAY, 
supra note 4, at 306-13. 
27. As to the underlying theory and methodology of Currie's interest analysis, see 
generally the discussion in Sedler, The Governmental Interest Approach to Choice of Law: 
An Analysis and a Reformulation, 25 UCLA L. REv. 181, 183-90 (1977). 
28. Such as Baxter's comparative impairment, see Baxter, Choice of Law and the 
Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1965), and Weintraub's functional analysis, see 
generally R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws (1971). 
29. See generally R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAw ch. 11 (3d ed. 1977); Leflar, 
Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 267 (1966); Leflar, 
Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1584 (1966). 
30. See generally D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS (1955); Twerski, 
Enlightened Territorialism and Professor Cavers-The Pennsylvania Method, 9 DuQ. L. 
REV. 373 (1971). 
31. See generally A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAws (1962); Ehrenzweig, A Proper 
Law in a Proper Forum: A "Restatement" of the "Lex Fori Approach", 18 OKLA. L. REV. 
340 (1965). 
32. See generally Baxter, supra note 28. 
33. See generally R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 28. 
34. See generally A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAw OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS: 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS (1965). 
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to areas of agreement, both books treat extensively the criticisms 
and refinements the "younger generation of conflicts scholars" 
have made of the various methodologies.35 
Reese & Rosenberg generally agree with Cramton, Currie, 
Kay and Martin on which methodologies to include, but they 
weight the methodologies differently. Reese & Rosenberg allocate 
equal, if limited, space to Currie's interest analysis, Ehrenzweig's 
"true rules," Leflar's choice-influencing considerations, von Meh-
ren and Trautman's functional analysis, and Cavers's principles 
of preference.38 Unlike the other authors, however, they virtually 
disregard the "younger generation." 
What is perhaps even more interesting, in light of the basic 
difference between Cram ton, Currie, Kay, and Martin, on the one 
hand, and Reese, Rosenberg, Scoles, and Weintraub, on the 
other, is the agreement among the four sets of authors on the 
cases to include in the casebook. I have identified thirty-two cases 
described as principal cases in all four books and forty-nine cases 
that are listed as principal cases in three of them.37 These eight-
one cases may be called the "core cases" of conflicts. Of these, 
forty-seven are United States Supreme Court cases, and, not sur-
prisingly, nineteen of the thirty-two cases common to all four 
books are Supreme Court cases. But it is the remaining cases that 
are most illustrative of the "core concept." 
I want to briefly note here what appear to be the "core cases" 
in the major areas of the subject. In regards to theory and rules 
of the traditional approach to choice of law, we have Alabama 
Great Southern Railroad v. Carroll, 38 Milliken v. Pratt, 39 In re 
Estate of Barrie, 40 Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 41 Levy 
35. The term is taken from CRAMTON, CUIUUE & KAY, supra note 4, at 7. 
36. These principles of preference are territorially based and were originally formu-
lated as solutions to the true conflict. Professor Cavers subsequently indicated that they 
may have broader application, and Professor Twerski has built on them to develop what 
may be called the neo-territorialism approach. See the discussion in Sedler, supra note 
27, at 204-07. · 
37. I have taken the author's definition of "principal case," as indicated in the Table 
of Cases to each book. However, the authors differ somewhat among themselves in their 
definition: some include set off cases given extensive note coverage following the "main 
case" as principal cases, others only the "main cases" and do not set off other cases. 
My method of determining the "core cases" actually understates the extent of agree-
ment among the casebook authors. I have not included the cases which two of the books 
list as principal cases and which receive substantial note treatment in the other two books, 
although they are not listed as principal cases. 
38. 97 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803 (1892). It is included in all four casebooks. The number of 
inclusions will hereafter be indicated in parentheses. 
39. 125 Mass. 374 (1878) (3). 
40. 240 Iowa 431, 35 N.W.2d 658 (1949) (4). 
· 41. 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918) (3). 
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u. Steiger, 42 and Walton u. Arabian American Oil Co. 43 For domi-
cile, there is White u. Tennant, 44 for marriage, In re Estate of 
May, 45 and for the statute of limitations, Boumias u. Atlantic 
Maritime Co. 46 When we want to teach the use of "escape de-
vices" to ayoid the operation of the rules of the traditional ap-
proach, the "core cases" are Grant u. McAulifte, 47 University of 
Chicago u. Dater, 48 Leuy u. Daniels' U-Driue Auto Renting Co, 49 
Haumschild u. Continental Casualty Co., 50 and Kilberg u. North-
east Airlines, Inc. 51 The "core cases" illustrating' modern ap-
proaches to choice of law are Auten u. Auten, 52 Babcock v. 
Jackson, 53 Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 54 Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 
Neumeir u. Kuehner, 56 Dym u. Gordon, 57 Cipolla u. Shaposka, 58 
Wyatt v. Fulrath, 59 Addison v. Addison, 60 and Western Airlines, 
Inc. u. Sobieski. 61 Other "casebook favorites," apart from Su-
preme Court cases, are Worthley u. Worthley, 62 Pritchard u. 
Norton, 63 Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 84 Rosenstiel v. 
Rosenstiel, 85 Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 66 Atkinson u. Superior 
Court, 67 Alton v. Alton, 68 and Harnischfeger Sales Corp. v. Stern-
berg Dredging Co. 69 
42. 233 Mass. 600, 124 N.E. 477 (1919) (3). 
43. 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1956) (4). 
44. 31 W.Va. 790, 8 S.E. 596 (1888) (3). 
45. 305 N.Y. 486, 114 N.E.2q. 4 (1953) (4). 
46. 220 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1955) (3). 
47. 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953) (4). 
48. 277 Mich. 658, 270 N.W. 175 (1936) (4). 
49. 108 Conn. 333, 143 A. 163 (1928) (3). 
50. 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959) (3). 
51. 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961) (3). 
52. 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954) (3). 
53. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963) (4). 
54. 239 Or. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964) (4). 
55. 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961) (4). 
56. 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972) (4). 
57. 16 N.Y.2d 120, 290 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965) (3). 
58. 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854 (1970) (3). 
59. 16 N.Y.2d 169, 211 N.E.2d 637, 264 N.Y.S.2d 233 (1965) (3). 
60. 62 Cal. 2d 558, 399 P.2d 897, 43 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1965) (3). 
61. 191 Cal.App. 2d 399, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1961) (3). 
62. 44 Cal. 2d 465, 283 P.2d 19 (1955) (3). 
63. 106 U.S. 124 (1882) (3). 
64. 274 U.S. 403 (1927) (3). 
65. 16 N.Y.2d 64, 209 N.E.2d 709, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1965) (3). 
66. 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), affd. on rehearing en bane, 410 F.2d 117 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969) (4). 
67. 49 Cal. 2d 338,316 P.2d 960 (1957) (4). 
68. 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953), vacated as moot, 347 U.S. 610 (1954) (4). 
69. 189 Miss. 73, 191 So. 94 (1939), affd. on rehearing, 189 Miss. 73, 195 So. 322 (1940) 
(3). 
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My rough-and possibly not fully accurate-arithmetic indi-
cates the following degree of inclusion in the various casebooks. 
Of the 114 cases in Professor Martin's book fifty-two, or 45.6% are 
"core cases." Of the 118 cases in the Cramton, Currie & Kay 
book, seventy-four, or 62.7% are "core cases." Since the Reese & 
Rosenberg and Scoles & Weintraub books both contain many 
more cases than the other two and cover a number of areas the 
other two do not, they predictably have a smaller percentage, but 
not necessarily a smaller number, of "core cases." Of the 188 
cases in Reese & Rosenberg, seventy-four, or 34%, are "core 
cases." Of the 188 cases in Scoles & Weintraub, seventy-three or 
29% are "core cases." Clearly the authors of the conflicts case-
books substantially agree as to the "core cases" in the field. 
This agreement as to the "core cases" indicates that teachers 
of the subject and casebook authors have found them to be good 
teaching vehicles. A number of them are "older" cases, and there 
is no disposition to appear "modem" by including cases simply 
because of their more recent vintage. The "core cases" illustrate 
effectively the kinds of conflicts problems that have arisen and 
the differing ways that the courts have dealt with those problems. 
It may also be that by "common consent" these cases provide a 
frame of reference by which conflicts problems can be studied and 
analyzed and different methodologies explored. In any event, to 
the teacher of the subject, it is comforting to know that there is 
agreement as to the "core cases." 
My review of Professor Martin's excellent casebook has occa-
sioned an analysis of the other casebooks in the field as well. The 
experience has been an enlightening one, at least for me. The 
casebooks reflect two basic pedagogical approaches to the teach-
ing of conflicts, and for each approach, there are two excellent 
casebooks. At the same time, there seems to be a good deal of 
agreement on the methodologies that should be emphasized and 
on the "core cases" that should be included. The teachers of 
conflicts have been well served by their colleagues who have un-
dertaken to produce casebooks for their use. 
